It can’t be that only 1 or few people will decide about project future making changes. I suggest to set minimum of at least 100 separate votes from people which are not lisk members in order to proceed the vote. Moreover, I suggest that any voting can’t be done only by Lisk DAO members or Lisk Foundation or both.
Why? Because lisk DAO and Lisk Foundation or both can’t decide for themselves without community opinion and votes. It have no sense to make and change law for yourself only. If 100 is too big number for now then it may be 50 or 25.
No, it’s a bad idea (only those who hold tokens should vote, otherwise it can be manipulated), but what worries me the most is that, at this point, the community can’t oppose the team or a potential attack to influence the voting outcome. If Oliver pauses, he will have nearly 10 million votes. If Max pauses, he will also have around 10 million votes. The team has already paused and holds 6 million votes. Bingo, 3 people are enough to reach quorum and make decisions as they please. This is not a good situation. There are 30 million tokens locked in total, and if we subtract ~9.8 million, which belong to the team, Max, and Oliver (Max has 4.33 million, Oliver has 3.45 million, and the team holds 2 million), only 21 million tokens remain. Now tell me, what are the chances that 100% of the community will vote? Exactly, zero! This is just theoretical. As usual, not everyone will vote, and even half of them won’t pause, let alone lock their tokens for 2 years or even a year. So, it’s a clear loss. This is essentially a power grab, especially considering that some people won’t even read anything and will just vote like Max or the team. And that’s assuming @Przemer will protect the community’s interests, although it’s not certain that his opinion will not always align with the team’s. In that case, only four people would be needed to vote, and no one else would matter—whatever they want, they’ll decide. Overall, the situation is not looking good.
Let me reiterate, I’m not claiming that this will happen, nor do I want to slander anyone. I’m simply saying that the situation, both from a theoretical and practical standpoint, looks unhealthy. As someone who considers themselves a critical thinker, I’m just pointing out the gaps that need to be addressed to make the Lisk community even stronger and more decentralized.
P.S. Why do I often highlight @Przemer? Because he is the last stronghold of community protection AT THIS MOMENT (considering the current voting power distribution). This doesn’t mean that I will always be against the team (that would be crazy); I only oppose things where I genuinely believe change is needed. Accordingly, I might even align with the same position as the team and Max. The issue is that if Przemer votes the same way as the team, there won’t even be a theoretical chance left if the team decides to push through an initiative that’s unfavorable for the community or the ecosystem (and we are part of it). I hope my position is clear in this context. Thanks, everyone.
P.s.P.s. Here’s why @Przemer and I support the removal of the pause mechanism in its current form, or alternatively, for the pause to only serve as a stop to the countdown (reducing the lockup days), with Voting Power automatically increasing proportionally to the lockup time.
The fact that larger delegates in a Delegated Proof of Stake (DPoS) system, such as in Lisk, may potentially have more influence over decision-making, including project-related changes, raises certain concerns about decentralization and power balance.
Key issues and concerns:
- Concentration of power in the hands of a few: In DPoS systems, the delegates who receive the most votes have greater influence over managing the network. If a few delegates, backed by the largest token holders, dominate the network, they can effectively control decisions related to protocol changes, project direction, or the adoption of new features. This means that smaller investors and ecosystem participants may have limited ability to influence key project decisions.
- Financial motivations of delegates: In some cases, delegates may act in their own financial interest or in the interest of those who support them, rather than pursuing the good of the entire project. Such concentration of power could lead to a situation where the project is developed in a way that primarily benefits those with larger resources, potentially limiting innovation and broad adoption of the technology.
- Potential lack of decentralization: The core idea of blockchain is decentralization and the elimination of the need to trust a single group or entity. However, if delegates in DPoS have excessive control, it could undermine this decentralization, making the system more vulnerable to “oligarchic rule.” As a result, the network becomes more centralized, which contradicts the fundamental principles of blockchain.
- Project decisions and user votes: Although DPoS gives users the ability to vote for delegates who make decisions, in practice, large entities with more tokens have greater voting power. This could lead to a situation where most project decisions are made by a small group, limiting the representation of the entire community’s interests.
Potential solutions or ways to mitigate the issues:
- Delegate rotation: To prevent the monopolization of power by a few delegates, mechanisms such as rotation or other “term limits” could be introduced, limiting how long a given delegate can remain in power. This would give more people the opportunity to have a real impact on the network.
- Vote distribution: Some DPoS systems consider changes to the voting mechanism, such as reducing the voting power of the largest token holders (e.g., by introducing limits on how many votes one address can control), which would help distribute power and ensure a more equitable voting system.
- Reputation and transparency of delegates: Another solution could involve implementing a reputation system for delegates, based on their contributions to the project, transparency, and actions for the benefit of the entire community, not just the amount of tokens they hold. Such a system could promote delegates who bring real value to the project, rather than those who simply have large amounts of capital.
- Democratization of voting: Projects could promote greater community involvement through educational campaigns that encourage smaller users to actively vote. If a larger number of smaller investors began using their voting rights, it could counteract the concentration of power.
Conclusion:
The fact that larger delegates may outvote others on project-related changes is a real risk in a DPoS system like Lisk. It can lead to the centralization of power and limit the influence of average users on the project’s development. To counter this, mechanisms that promote greater decentralization and balance of voting power are needed. The community must be engaged, and the project should strive to implement solutions that minimize the possibility of power concentration in the hands of a few major entities.
Explain me why you think it’s bad idea to implement community vote requirement.
Did you check what GPT generate for you? 
Lisk isn’t DPoS. Delegated Voting System using in the DAO, that increase participation in the voting, that’s all. If you don’t want to delegate, just vote yourself.
I think in general, we cannot rely on number of addresses participating in DAO right now because
- one address does not correspond to one human
- number of people who doesn’t have much stake in the project shouldn’t decide on the future of the project
- People can delegate to others, so 1 delegate can represents 100 people or more
I think ultimately, people who has stake in the project are the people who are affected by the decision, so it’s not really about the number of people.
Additionally, if we want to introduce the minimum number of address as a requirement, then
- Direct voting (remove delegation possibility)
- Proof of Humanness
need to be introduced, but direct voting will decrease overall participation of the DAO, so I don’t think that’s something that we want
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