Don’t you think the constitution should also be adopted on-chain?
And what about increasing the quorum for transfers above a certain threshold?
And I don’t want to adopt it in parts because other aspects(like quorum(24M), threshold(300k)) depend on the pause mechanism. At this stage of Lisk, I don’t want to adopt the quorum mechanism (yes + abstain). Later, maybe(if total VP(voting power) will be more than 60M and more than 75% will be in the hands of community), but for now - no.
Honestly, I have no idea what the implications are of including “this or that” in the constitution. Some things are enforced by the smart contract anyway, even if they’re excluded from the constitution. Perhaps the constitution should specify what is enforced by the smart contract (not sure).
If we want to change technical aspects like the boosting or quorum mechanics, we should create separate threads to keep things organized, and then hold an appropriate vote if there’s agreement on any changes.
I agree, that’s why I made suggestion to change qourum requirements but I don’t know if you guys are interested in discussing it or if anyone here have idea how to improve in such way to allow voting at any time. If you are willing to discuss it create new proposal because I’m tired of hitting the wall.
Generally we don’t want a situation in which we will make rules and procedures that will be complicated, we need simple rules to avoid situation in which people will have to spent x amount of time reading rules to know what’s going on.
Honestly, I have no idea what the implications are of including “this or that” in the constitution. Some things are enforced by the smart contract anyway, even if they’re excluded from the constitution.
The constitution is an opportunity for community to approve what we have designed for the DAO so far, to give feedback and add own ideas about the purpose and values of the DAO.
Excluding things from constitution would simply mean the community hasn’t agreed on this topic, yet. We can amend the constitution, once an agreement is achieved.
What do you think about Polkadots Adaptive Quorum Biasing? Sounds like an interesting approach to me:
Polkadot’s Adaptive Quorum Biasing changes the supermajority required for a referendum to pass based on the percentage of voter turnout.
- A positive turnout bias requires a heavy supermajority of aye votes to carry at low turnouts, but as turnout increases towards 100%, it becomes a simple majority-carries as above. We call this a “positive” turnout bias because the required margin of ayes increases as turnout increases.
- A negative turnout bias requires a heavy supermajority of nay votes to reject at low turnouts, but as turnout increases towards 100%, it becomes a simple majority-carries as above. We call this a “negative” turnout bias because the required margin of nays increases as turnout increases.
Undoubtedly, we need Adaptive Quorum - this is a key goal to achieve right now. We also need to regain investor’s trust. I strongly recommend:
Those 3 points I mentioned are just as important as Adaptive Quorum and will be a strong foundation for the future. Having Polkadots Adaptive Quorum Biasing 1:1 copy-paste to lisk project will be better than not having adaptive quorum at all.
Don’t be afraid to make those changes because after all it’s not about your vision, it’s about giving people what they want to get and you can’t go wrong when majority of the community voting in favor of something.
Looks promising, but it would need further research to determine if it works for our DAO. Perhaps the turnout/% of yes curve should also be adjusted. There’s a risk of a ‘sneaky’ proposal with low turnout and zero/few ‘no’ votes, not likely, but still a possibility.
I assume the percentage turnout is based on the currently locked tokens, not the entire supply. In that case, the proposed adaptive quorum only works if there are enough locked tokens in the system. With a small number of locked tokens, turnout would always appear high.
Sounds interesting, but I would adjust the idea as follows: it should be supplemented with other measures, such as a quorum median and a minimum quorum value. What I mean is, for example, we keep the median at 24 million and set the minimum quorum at 12 million (if only 11 million voting power participated, the vote is considered invalid, and the quorum is not met). However, if exactly 12 million voting power participates, 75% ‘Yes’ votes and 25% ‘No’ votes (i.e., a 3:1 ratio) would be required for the decision to pass. If ‘No’ votes exceed 25%, for example, 26%, then the proposal is considered rejected. This ratio would gradually transition to a simple majority as participation increases, with one extra vote determining the majority. For example, if 30 million voting power participates, no adjustments would be needed, and the vote would be counted as usual, with a simple majority deciding the outcome, whether ‘Yes’ or ‘No.’
Why don’t I see a need for adjustments when the turnout exceeds the quorum? Because that already means the majority is making the decision, and simple rules would be sufficient.
I think allowing for 12M quorum with requirement 75% votes for “yes” to pass is a good idea. We can go even further allowing 6M quorum with requirement 90% votes for “yes”. As general idea looks ok the 12m and 6m values shouldn’t be fixed but rather adaptive. % “yes” requirement should be adaptive - less voting power / smaller quorum = higher % needed to pass and if 24M or more normal voting. If no there is no point of having fixed values if votes will turn out to be e.g. 12.1M or 11.95M. Will be hard to hit the spot.
Thanks for your feedback regarding the adaptive quorum!
I think it is an interesting topic, but unfortunately there is no quick way of implementing it in the DAO, because the Tally UI does not support an adaptive quorum by default. Imho the quorum discussion should be moved into a separate thread. If we really want to go this path, we could ask Tally to customize the UI to support the adaptive quorum, but this will probably be very costly. Or we try to find an alternative UI that works better for us, or even go the path of developing our own UI.
FYI I have updated the draft now and removed the sections regarding voting power calculation and the voting power boost; if there are no further remarks or requests regarding the constitution, we can start the vote on this soon 
Tally not having option as default is not good for Tally. If it is possible but very expensive it is not good for lisk. On the other hand it is not good for lisk to switch from tally to something else because we all know that lisk team is working in slow motion compared to other projects meaning if we switch from tally to different platform it is very likely that we won’t have vote for burn or allocate on time and it was rescheduled already by almost a year. If we fail to make that rescheduled vote it will be the end of this project at least for me I will quit. We need more dapps and we need them for yesterday. Developing our own UI for voting is the best option but we have to make that burn or allocate vote on time it’s the most important thing we should focus on now. Make it happen, don’t reschedule again. If lisk fail again to do simple vote then it’s total garbage.
To be honest, I don’t want to vote on things separately! Let me explain why. Everything we’re discussing is interconnected. For example, DAO tokens and their minting are also included in the constitution. But I didn’t create this tokenomics, it was given to me as is, so I personally don’t want to vote in parts. Once a decision is made regarding the token burn, I’ll be able to say what I would like to do with those 45 million tokens. And based on that, I will vote.
Sure, 5% voting power max cap would be perfect to introduce before voting on lisk token burn or allocate.
I don’t see any problem in the tokenomics being in the constitution.
And it also doesn’t need an extra vote on this. Once we do the 100M vote, if the result is that we keep the tokens, we can just update the constitution accordingly, without the need of a separate vote.
What if people just split their wallet into several accounts, to circumvent it?
I see it. I don’t want to vote on the constitution until the decision on what to do with the 100M tokens is made, and I believe that’s the right stance. Either completely remove the tokenomics (once again, I’m not trying to claim anything I wasn’t asked about, and how does the DAO relate to the decision made by the team anyway? If you want to ask me, then ask about the whole tokenomics, not separate parts of it, otherwise just remove the entire tokenomics section, because this is simply shifting responsibility onto the DAO, so later you can say: ‘The DAO approved it after all’), and leave only the interaction elements (which won’t change under any circumstances).
Also, I’m not sure the patronage of Onchain Foundation in its current form (moderation, etc.) is appropriate because the 300K voting power is the actual protection from spam. Why should the Onchain Foundation decide what is spam and what is not? If we want to implement spam protection, we can set a rule allowing only one proposal per address with 300K votes per month. I would aim to avoid anything centralized and push everything toward decentralization as much as possible. I also have concerns about quorum and would remove it as well.
Moreover, considering the post described here, I think it’s important to include a point that all team-affiliated votes should not exceed 20% of the total voting power (decided collectively, by vote, without team participation), which at the current level equals 8M (and will grow as total voting power increases — I don’t know how to implement this technically, but the current situation is definitely wrong). Otherwise, it’s not a DAO decision, but a decision made by Max and the team. But this is just MY opinion, I don’t know how others feel about it. And what matters more here: the number of opinions or their weight (voting power).
P.S. I’m acting as a critic, a constructive critic(maybe not always 
). If everyone just applauds you, there will be no growth. At the same time, I’m offering ways to improve the current system, to make it more decentralized and stronger on the Web3 battlefield. I’m still spending a lot of time writing all of this, I’ve locked and staked my tokens, so it’s important to see me as someone highlighting issues that MAY need to be addressed, improved, or, after working through the criticism, realize that everything is actually working well. I’m on the ship, not outside of it. Thank you.
Simple rule - if you see that tokens on wallets that holds more than 5% voting power are changed that means if for example in Max or in Olivier’s account tokens will decrease that will be indicator that they split tokens to different wallets to be able to have more than 5% voting power. In this case you removing them from certain voting by removing their vote and investigate to which wallets they sended tokens and removing votes from those wallets as well. This will require mechanics that are not possible on tally so as I said it will be the best to hire a guy who can write application for lisk voting taking into consideration those mechanics. It can be even automated so you won’t have to investigate it. This mechanic applied to all wallets that hold more than 5% voting power will make a big difference and will be very good for lisk community.
P.s. @Mona Can we ban him? It’s a joke of course, but his answer looks the same 
I even think my suggestion to limit the team’s voting power to 20% is absurd because it’s very hard to implement and pointless. We simply need to urgently attract more people to staking, but how do we do that? Maybe the team has an answer. If we could double or triple the community’s overall voting weight, all issues would resolve themselves. This can probably only be achieved by increasing staking rewards and introducing a mechanism for automatic voting power increase based on time proportion. In any case, there’s a lot to think about.
By the way, maybe Oliver could announce that he will not vote until the total voting power reaches 80M, for example. That would solve most of the problems.
And of course, I expected that the team, Max and Oliver will not vote on 100M DAO proposal. Why? Explained here. I hope we can gain more and more voting power before the vote and reach the quorum ourselves. If not, it will show that something is going wrong.
Another hateful post. Increasing staking rewards only devalue lisk token. You want bigger numbers on your wallet, people and investors want value. Stacking and minting won’t make lisk more popular. What you mean reach qourum ourselves? Meaby only you and few other people want to make decissions? If yes then only you and those few people will stay in this project and the rest will go elsewhere where they really have something to say. Lisk to zero with your greedy strategy.